Volume 17, Issue 2 (2013)
CLR 2013, 17(2): 47-71 |
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Hojati1 S M A, Rahmani2 H. Legal Indeterminacy in Contemporary Legal Theory. CLR 2013; 17 (2) :47-71
URL: http://clr.modares.ac.ir/article-20-226-en.html
URL: http://clr.modares.ac.ir/article-20-226-en.html
1- 1- Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
2- 2- M.A., Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
2- 2- M.A., Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract: (7894 Views)
The debate over whether judges’ decisions are adequately constrained by law is predicated on a more fundamental issue, namely, whether the law is indeterminate. In the debates over legal indeterminacy, the most basic issue that may arise is: "What is the source of legal indeterminacy?" By emphasizing on the three distinct sources of those “gaps”, three distinct approaches in legal theory emerge: an ontic approach, a semantic approach, and an epistemic approach. Philosophers have also taken a parallel threefold approache to describe the similar phenomenon of vagueness. In what follows, we describe those parallel accounts, and show that they may be reconcilable in a more comprehensive theory.
* Corresponding author’s E-mail: hojatima@modares.ac.ir
* Corresponding author’s E-mail: hojatima@modares.ac.ir
Received: 2013/04/6 | Accepted: 2013/09/18 | Published: 2013/09/22
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